Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP85-00664R000400080007-3 cm ER Sol 72-712, Box 9 June 1961 General Maxwell D. Taylor MEMORANDUM FOR: I enclose a couple of suggestions on the recommendations and then the proposed Recommendation #6 which one might call the "incentive" recommendation. I am sure this can be much improved but it may serve as an initial draft. What I have in mind is that there is very little use in the machinery proposed unless all of the agencies concerned are brought to work vigorously to carry out its proposals. I feel this is important as today, partly as a result of Cuba, there is a strong tide running in the other direction. ALLEN W. DULLES Director Enclosures AWD/ji 1 - DCI voc. 4, Sh 4 745

SEPTEMBER CHY

They are convinced that they can use methods to accomplish this which will not cause us to resort to overt action to thwart them and that no one single take-over will be enough to rouse the Western world, and the United States in particular, to action.

2.

The Communist Bloc is already convinced that it has developed the techniques and the apparatus to gain their objectives. They are now realising enough gains by these means to make them believe that over the next few decades they can isolate the main bastiques of freedom, the U.S., Western Europe and the strong points we still have in Asia and Africa. It is therefore recommended that if the President reaches a determination as to the timeliness of further organizing to deal with this particular threat to our national security, possibly along the lines of recommendation 1, then steps should be taken to insure the full cooperation of all agencies of government to make this effective and that the assets to accomplish this purpose should have a high priority call upon our resources both human and material.

Such a general determination should be communicated to the American people. In addition, appropriate collaboration with our allies in NATO, SEATO, and CENTO should be sought whereby their collaboration could effectively advance the purposes of this program.

PROPERTY OF COMM

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP85-00664R000400080007-3

Step 13. 6414

We also recommend that one of the first tasks of the CWSC should be to prepare a careful analysis of the overall plans and assets of the Communist Bloc for their subversive campaign, together with detailed studies of the particular situation in each country of the world where the communist threat is most serious, with recommendations as to the most effective means of dealing with this threat before it reaches dangerous proportions.

One basic lesson to be learned from the Cuban situation is that even after the conclusion was reached that Castro had passed the point of he return, there was no adequate planning of the steps necessary to eliminate the danger.